In the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in an atmospheric release of radioactive materials, stationary gamma-measurements, for example obtained from distributed, automatic monitoring stations, may provide a first assessment of exposures resulting from airborne and deposited activity. Decisions on the introduction of countermeasures for the protection of the public can be based on such off-site gamma measurements. A methodology is presented for calculation of gamma-radiation action levels for the introduction of specific countermeasures, based on probabilistic modelling of the dispersion of radionuclides and the radiation exposure. The methodology is applied to a nuclear accident situation with long-range atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides, and action levels of dose rate measured by a network of monitoring stations are estimated for sheltering and foodstuff restrictions. It is concluded that the methodology is applicable to all emergency countermeasures following a nuclear accident but measurable quantities other than ambient dose equivalent rate are needed for decisions on the introduction of foodstuff countermeasures.
Introduction
In the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency resulting in the dispersion of radioactive materials into the environment, the effective implementation of countermeasures for the protection of the public will largely depend upon the adequacy of advance preparation. This should include capabilities for detection of anthropogenic radionuclides in the environment and the preparation of emergency response plans to control and limit the consequences of the accident by averting exposures to the affected population [1, 2] . In the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident many European countries established networks of automatic gamma-monitoring stations equipped with, for example, ionisation chambers or scintillation detectors to detect a passing radioactive plume [3, 4] . These networks are primarily aimed at providing early warning of the dispersion of radionuclides following a nuclear accident. However, gamma-measurements obtained from automatic gamma-monitoring stations distributed nationwide may also provide a first assessment of the exposures from airborne or deposited activity, and may be used to estimate the doses that may be averted by specific urgent countermeasures.
The automatic gamma-monitoring stations will provide time series of ambient dose equivalent rate or similar quantities. Other operational quantities that can easily be measured after an accident include air concentration and surface contamination density. While decisions on specific countermeasures in a nuclear accident situation should be based on an estimate of the avertable dose, the measured gamma-radiation quantities, for example the gamma dose rate, will be correlated with the avertable dose, and action levels in terms of the measured dose rate may be defined to aid decision on the introduction of countermeasures.
In the present paper, a methodology is described for determining action levels for urgent countermeasures based on radiation monitoring data obtained from a network of stationary monitoring stations. Since to be effective the countermeasures should be introduced at a time where the scale of the accident is very uncertain, only a probabilistic assessment of the avertable dose from a countermeasure will be possible. Action levels in terms of the measured gamma-radiation are inferred from the probability distribution of the avertable dose, conditioned upon the values of ambient dose equivalent rate or other radiation monitoring data available. This approach differs from the deterministic approach usually applied in that probability distributions are assigned to the model parameters describing the release, transport and exposures to radionuclides from a nuclear accident instead of using a point estimate of these parameters (see e.g. [5] [6] [7] ).
Two sets of dose rate levels for the introduction of specific countermeasures may be defined and be included in emergency response plans. If the measured dose rate at a monitoring station exceeds a cautiously defined action level for which there is a small, e.g. 5%, probability that the avertable dose will be larger than the intervention level (IL) for a given protective action, precautionary countermeasures may be initiated and/or mobile teams dispatched to survey possibly affected areas. A second, larger level, the 'operational intervention level', can be defined for which countermeasures should be initiated automatically, when the expectation of the avertable dose is equal to the intervention level for the countermeasure considered. Hence, when the dose rate is equal to the action level, there is a small (but finite) probability that intervention is justified, and when the dose rate equals the operational intervention level, it is just expected that intervention is justified. Action levels for protective actions such as sheltering, evacuation and banning of foodstuffs will be both accident-and site-specific; the avertable dose will depend on release characteristics like radionuclide composition and site characteristics like meteorology, shielding/location factors and transfer factors.
As a case study, the proposed method is applied to a nuclear accident situation with longrange atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides. A network of automatic gamma-monitoring stations performing dose rate measurements registers the radioactive plume from the accident, and dose rate action levels for sheltering and foodstuff restrictions are derived. While the dose rate action levels for sheltering in the present case study are found to be of the order of some tens to some hundreds of microsieverts per hour, dose rate action levels for precautionary foodstuff restrictions may in a 'worst case' scenario be as low as one nanosievert per hour and therefore below the detection limit of total dose rate increase above the background radiation level for most monitoring systems applied in emergency management.
Monitoring as basis for urgent countermeasures

Automatic gamma-monitoring networks
The nuclear threat scenarios considered are those in which radioactive substances are dispersed into the environment and which may require intervention measures for the protection of the public. A host of threat scenarios may be considered including accidents at nuclear facilities and terrorist activities with the malevolent intent of causing radiation exposure [1, 8] . The scenarios will differ both with respect to the radionuclides involved, the spatial extent of the contamination and the timing of the event. Distributed gamma-monitoring systems may provide early warning of such events and a first assessment of the radiological situation. However, a reasonably sparse national automatic gamma-monitoring network may only effectively address threat scenarios, where an accident at a large nuclear facility causes radioactive materials to be released to the atmosphere and subsequently to be widely dispersed. Other threat scenarios, for example radiological accidents or dispersion of radioactive substances by terrorist activities, require a much denser network and/or the existence of an operational mobile monitoring system to allow for local mapping of the affected territory, including monitoring for pure beta-emitters.
The objectives of the automatic gamma-monitoring system are shown schematically in figure 1 . The distributed automatic gamma-monitoring system may comprise both dose-rate monitors and gamma spectroscopic instrumentation, allowing for spectral information on a passing radioactive plume. If an increase of the radiation level above the natural fluctuations in the background level is registered, an alarm indicating anthropogenic radionuclides in the environment is triggered (the alarm branch). This alarm may activate the emergency management. Further (mobile) measurements of possibly affected areas may be initiated in order to assess the situation and precautionary countermeasures may or may not be invoked, depending on other information that may be available in the situation.
In the assessment branch, the severity of a radiological situation is assessed. The assessment can be based directly (solely) on data from the automatic monitoring network or by incorporating other measurements indicative of the dispersion of a radioactive plume, for example from mobile measurements. In the first case, the measurements are compared with predefined action levels (ALs) for the introduction of specific countermeasures. If the measurements at the automatic gamma-monitoring stations exceed a lower, cautiously defined action level, precautionary countermeasures to reduce stochastic health effects may be invoked. Because of the uncertainty in forecasting exposures based on radiation measurements, this action level may be defined conservatively, to ensure notice on events that just may require intervention. If the measured dose rate would exceed a (usually larger) operational intervention level (OIL) for which the expected avertable dose is equal to the intervention level, specific countermeasures might be triggered automatically. Alternatively, in a data assimilation process, data from various sources are utilised to assess the situation: measurements in the environment of external dose rates and gross activity concentrations in air as well as meteorological data can be combined with model calculations to predict avertable doses by a given urgent countermeasure [9, 10] . The data assimilation process may be initiated by an alarm, or may be carried out automatically, not depending on an initial alarm.
For the emergency management it is a priority to acquire information on the presence of anthropogenic radionuclides in the environment. From this perspective the alarm level at an automatic gamma-monitoring system should be set as low as possible, limited only by technical/economical constraints. These constraints constitute a lower limit to the sensitivity (detection limit) of the monitoring system. In setting the alarm level, it is, however, equally important that false alarms, for example due to natural variations in the background level, are kept at a minimum. An upper limit to the sensitivity of an automatic gamma-monitoring system is obtained by requiring that events that may necessitate protective intervention measures should be detected. This upper limit is determined by the action level for the countermeasure. Hence, the dose rate detection limit of the system should be better than the action level(s) associated with the possible onset of protective countermeasures.
Exposure pathways and urgent countermeasures
Members of the public may be exposed to radiation, either externally or internally by various pathways. Three dominant contributors to exposures in the emergency phase of a nuclear accident have been identified: whole body exposure from external gamma-radiation from plume and ground deposits; thyroid exposure from inhalation of radioiodine; and exposure of other organs (e.g. lungs) from inhalation of radioactive materials. In addition, ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs will result in committed doses, which together with the external radiation contribute to the long-term exposure [11] . Any of these exposure modes could dominate the total effective dose, depending upon the type of radionuclides in the release and their chemical and physical forms. The radionuclides released and the pathways by which they will reach man will therefore affect the applicability of the protective actions. The protective actions that need to be introduced quickly in the event of a nuclear accident or major radiological emergency are the following:
• sheltering • evacuation • iodine prophylaxis • precautionary foodstuff restrictions and control of water quality.
Countermeasures will in general be justified if the benefit of dose reduction outweighs the costs of introducing the countermeasure. This may be quantified in terms of an intervention level (IL) of avertable dose. The need for protective measures is then determined by comparing the avertable doses by introducing the protective action to the intervention level. Generic intervention levels have been suggested by IAEA [6, 7] , see table 1, and by EU [12] .
Considering foodstuff restrictions, the avertable dose is a less useful quantity in emergency response planning. Rather, intervention criteria in terms of activity concentrations may be applied, as provided for example by the EU, setting limits on the activity concentrations in foodstuffs that are placed on the market [13] or by Codex Alimentarius defining Guidance Levels for foodstuffs intended for international trade, see table 2 [14] . The Guideline Levels from Codex Alimentarius are designed to be applied only to radionuclide contamination of food moving in international trade following an accident. As the proposed levels have extensive conservative assumptions built in, guideline levels for the three radionuclide groups should be observed independently [14] .
Action levels from probabilistic assessment of the radiation exposure
Probabilistic assessment of dose rates and avertable doses
When decisions on intervention are to be based on environmental measurements, one should aim for the highest correlation between the measured quantities and the dose that may be averted by the countermeasure. Considering sheltering or evacuation, the ambient dose equivalent rate from the plume would be a relevant quantity to apply. For other countermeasures, for example iodine prophylaxis and foodstuff restrictions, the correlation would be smaller, depending on the relative radionuclide composition in the plume. One example is a situation when there is no radioiodine in the release, and thus no indication for iodine prophylaxis, regardless of the magnitude of the measured dose rate. Another example is an accidental release of actinides where the external dose rate or even doses from inhalation of resuspended material would be negligible but where foodstuff restrictions might be warranted due to the committed doses from ingested foodstuffs. Relevant operational quantities would here be air concentration of iodine and surface contamination density of actinides, respectively.
For convenience, in the following the results of the radiation measurements is referred to as the dose rate, d. While the ambient dose equivalent rate may often be the measured quantity at automatic gamma-monitoring stations, d could also be a spectral count rate indicative of, for example, the iodine or caesium activity concentration in air or the surface contamination density of deposited radionuclides.
Both the measured dose rate at a network of gamma-monitoring stations and the doses that may be averted by specific countermeasures are subject to considerable variability and uncertainty. The variability/uncertainty has its origin in the assumptions regarding the release of radioactivity to the environment, the atmospheric dispersion and deposition of radionuclides, the equipment and spatial distribution of the gamma-monitoring system, and the effectiveness of the countermeasures considered. Among the more important factors influencing the dose estimate are the habits, for example dietary intake, time spent indoors, etc, of those individuals potentially affected, and the metabolism of any radioactive material taken into the body. The physical and chemical forms of the environmental contaminant may also be influential, as may agricultural practices and methods adopted in food preparation and processing. In addition, uncertainty of the gamma-measurements and results interpretation must be taken into account.
Because of the variability and uncertainty, a range of possible values of the avertable dose will correspond to any measured dose rate. The combined variability/uncertainty of the avertable dose and dose rate can be quantified in terms of a joint probability density function (pdf), p( E, d), comprising both the variability that is assumed to be known at the time of the accident, such as parameters describing the affected population, and genuine uncertainty, for example associated with forecasting the atmospheric transport of radionuclides. The pdf may be estimated based on assumptions on the dispersion and exposure to radionuclides following a nuclear accident, and it depends on the circumstances of the accident and nature of the contamination. The correlation between the avertable dose and the measured dose rate is shown schematically in figure 2.
Corresponding to each measured value d one may infer the conditional probability density function p( E|d), and from this distribution derive the conditional probability that the avertable dose exceeds the intervention level E IL . An action level of dose rate may then be defined corresponding to a chosen probability level r AL , i.e., Hence, E IL is the (1 − r AL )th quantile of the probability density function p( E|d AL ) and conversely, the dose rate action level, d AL , becomes a function of the probability level r AL . A cautious approach for the introduction of a countermeasure corresponds to choosing a small value of r AL , e.g. r AL = 5%. From the conditional probability density function one may also obtain the expected value of the avertable dose. An optimised operational intervention level, d OIL , may naturally be defined by setting the expected value equal to the intervention level for the protective action [15] ,
In figure 2 it is implicitly assumed that the dose rate action level is smaller than the operational intervention level, d AL < d OIL , the action level being identified with the possible introduction of precautionary countermeasures, see section 2.1, while the OIL automatically calls for intervention. The relation between the action levels d AL and the operational intervention level d OIL , however, depends on the details of the conditional probability density function p( E|d), and the requirement d AL < d OIL is only guaranteed for a sufficiently small probability level r AL .
Dose rate action levels for long-range atmospheric dispersion
In order to derive d AL and d OIL from equations (1), (2), it is necessary to estimate the joint probability distribution p( E, d) of dose rates and avertable doses. Considering the complex system of atmospheric dispersion and deposition, the radiation exposure pathways, and the system of intervention, assessment of measured dose rates and avertable doses will be very uncertain, and direct estimates of p( E, d) may not be feasible. Especially for long-range atmospheric dispersion, model uncertainties will be considerable as the models employed may not accurately describe the complex atmospheric conditions encountered during transport. Furthermore, an estimate of p( E, d) may be far from generic, as the joint distribution depends both on the distance from the release point and on the ensemble of weather conditions considered in the probabilistic study.
On the other hand, it is expected that gamma dose rates and avertable doses would be strongly correlated for some urgent countermeasures as indicated in figure 2 . To a large degree the variability of both the release and the atmospheric transport will have a similar effect on the dose rates and the avertable doses; for instance, dilution during transport will reduce the measured dose rates and the avertable doses by similar factors. Hence estimation of the ratios of dose rate to avertable dose, d/ E, will be less uncertain, and also, this ratio will be less sensitive to variation of the transport distance from the release point.
In case of a strong correlation between d and E an approximate form for the action levels can be obtained. Equation (1) can be rewritten as
As shown in the appendix, the conditional probability distribution may in this case be approximated by the unconstrained probability distribution of z, i.e.,
In the next section, this last equation will be used for calculating action levels for specific countermeasures based on automatic gamma-measurements of a radioactive plume originating at a large distance from the network of monitoring stations. From equation (4) it follows that the dose rate action levels are given directly by the quantiles of the pdf p(z).
Similarly, for long-range atmospheric transport the operational intervention level can be estimated from the unconstrained pdf, as
leading to the simple relation
In principle, a dose rate action level and an operational intervention level for restrictions on the trade and consumption of foodstuffs can be defined similarly to the AL and OIL defined in equations (4), (6) , which apply to urgent countermeasures such as sheltering, evacuation and iodine prophylaxis. In contrast to these urgent interventions, however, the relevant quantity for decision on foodstuff restrictions is the activity concentration in foodstuffs rather than the avertable dose. Generic intervention levels, c 
where the minimum is taken over the different radionuclide groups. With this definition, if the maximum observed dose rate at the monitoring stations is smaller than the action level d AL , the probability that the radionuclide activity concentrations in food will exceed the specified foodstuff intervention levels (Bq kg −1 ) for each radionuclide group will be smaller than r AL . Corresponding to the OIL for other urgent countermeasures, equation (6) , the operational dose rate intervention level for foodstuff restrictions for each of the radionuclide groups, and for the sum, can be written
where the minimum again is taken over the different radionuclide groups.
Application to a nuclear accident release situation
Although the defining equations for the dose rate ALs or OILs, equations (1) and (2), are fairly general the definitions may not be directly applied to nuclear emergency situations with long-range atmospheric dispersion. For long-range atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides originating from a large nuclear facility the approximate expressions for the dose rate action level and operational intervention levels given by equations (4)- (8) are applied. In the following case study, a release from a nuclear reactor is considered in which the radioactive plume is transported towards a country where it is detected by a national network of automatic gammamonitoring stations. It is assumed known whether the nuclear reactor has suffered a core melt or whether the release only contains noble gases. The gamma-monitoring network provides on-line information to the emergency management allowing for the immediate implementation of countermeasures; the network is assumed to be reasonably dense such that the radioactive plume is registered at least by one of the stations. The measurements consist of gamma dose rates and action levels are estimated for sheltering and foodstuff restrictions.
Dispersion and dose rate model
Release and dispersion of radionuclides.
The radionuclides in a nuclear facility, for example in a nuclear reactor, exist in a variety of physical and chemical forms of varied volatility. The characteristics of these materials show quite clearly that the potential for releases to the environment decreases significantly in the order gaseous materials, volatile solids, and non-volatile solids [16] . The in-plant situation during a nuclear accident will define the release scenario or source term, which is characterised by a time-dependent release rate for each radionuclide and parameters relevant for the dispersion in the environment. Aerosol size and chemical form have a direct impact on the deposition and plume depletion. The release rate is usually related to the core inventory at the start of the accident and expressed as release fractions for successive time periods. The release fractions are defined for groups of radionuclides of common physical and chemical nature. Atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides from the nuclear facility may follow very complex transport patterns, making atmospheric dispersion modelling very uncertain and prone to errors. It will, however, be useful to distinguish between short-range and long-range atmospheric dispersion. At short range, up to a few tens of kilometres from the release site the external gamma dose rates may contain contributions from many short-lived radionuclides, making it difficult to obtain a clear picture of the radionuclide composition of the radioactive plume from spectral measurements. At larger distances a simpler picture may emerge with respect to the radionuclide composition of the plume, as many of the short-lived radionuclides have decayed and also some of the heavier fuel fragments have been removed from the plume by dry or wet deposition. After the Chernobyl accident, only noble gases and a few volatile solids including chemical forms of cesium and iodine played a major role for the radiation exposure at large distances from the plant [11] .
The activity concentration in air roughly depends on the release and transport time from the source as
where r i is the released activity and λ i accounts for radionuclide decay and deposition during transport. The proportionality factor in equation (9) will depend on the details of the atmospheric transport from the release site. Both the measured dose rate and the avertable doses will be proportional to the activity concentration in air. However, since we only consider the ratio d/ E, without loss of generality one may normalise the total activity concentration to one, i χ i = 1.
Countermeasures are most likely to be required at locations where the avertable dose E attains a maximum. In general, this will not be at the location of any of the monitoring stations. Hence, with χ i being the maximum radionuclide activity concentration in air, the activity concentration at a monitoring station is reduced by a factor α 1 compared to the maximum value,
The factor α depends on the plume geometry and the density of the monitoring network, but the same factor is assumed to apply to all radionuclides, i.e., within the geographical area of interest a uniform radionuclide composition of the plume is assumed. Considering only widespread contamination, having a reasonably dense network will provide a lower bound on α.
Dose rate.
Radiation from the plume and from deposited radioactive material on the ground contributes to the external dose rate. During plume passage, the contribution from deposited activity will in most cases be small compared to direct gamma-radiation from the plume, especially in the early phase of plume passage, when decisions on countermeasures should preferably be taken. Also, in some cases the monitoring stations may have the gammadetectors shielded from the ground and only observing deposited activity through scattered radiation.
In accordance with equation (10), the gamma dose rates detected by a monitoring system can be written,
whereė plume,i is the dose conversion factor from activity concentration in air to external dose rate.
Sheltering.
Sheltering during plume passage may reduce both the external gamma doses from the plume and from deposited activity on the ground as well as the inhalation dose. The avertable dose equivalent can be written [17] :
where
• L plume(ground) is the plume (ground) location factor, i.e., the ratio of indoor to outdoor dose rate, and F is the corresponding building filtration factor, giving the ratio of indoor to outdoor radionuclide activity concentration.
•ė plume,i ,ė ground,i , and e inh,i (50) are the dose conversion factors for external radiation from the plume, the ground, and for inhalation.
• I is the breathing rate.
• T p is the plume passage time which is here assumed to be equal to the duration of sheltering.
• (v d + H ) i accounts for dry and wet deposition of radionuclides, where dry deposition is modelled as source depletion with the constant deposition velocity v d , while wet deposition is modelled by a scavenging coefficient i accounting for the removal of activity from the entire plume of height H .
The scavenging coefficient for aerosols is assumed to depend on the rainfall intensity, p, as
where a 0 = 10 −5 s −1 and p is given in mm h −1 [18] . With no rainfall the scavenging coefficient becomes zero.
Foodstuff restrictions.
Deposited activity will be transferred to plants and to food products, either via direct deposition on the plant surface, or indirectly, through root uptake of deposited activity. In the first few days following an accident, the two food types most likely to be affected are leafy green vegetables and cow's milk. Transfer to the plants varies strongly with time of deposition, with maximum transfer to the plants during the growth season, where direct deposition is the dominating pathway. The peak activity concentration in foodstuffs is proportional to the activity concentration on the ground after plume passage, and the total activity concentration in a foodstuff of a radionuclide group (k) is obtained by summing over all radionuclides in the group,
where TF i (m 2 kg −1 ) denotes the transfer factor of radionuclide i for the foodstuff considered. The activity concentration c i (Bq kg −1 ) will decrease over time, with equation (13) giving the peak value.
Parameters and results
Parameter values.
Two release scenarios have been considered for an accident at an RBMK reactor. In scenario 1, only noble gases and a small fraction of iodine are released from the reactor, while in scenario 2, the release contains large amounts of aerosols. The radionuclide inventory is taken from [19] . In both release scenarios, all of the noble gases is being released while the release of iodine and aerosols is parameterised by the iodine release fraction f I as shown in table 3.
The conversion factorsė plume,i for external gamma dose rate from the plume are estimated for semi-infinite plume geometry [20] , while the conversion factorsė ground,i for the external gamma dose rate from deposited activity are estimated for an infinite plane surface and an effective relaxation depth of 3 mm, corresponding to fresh deposition on a gravelled area [21] . Contribution from external beta-radiation to the dose has been neglected. Finally, the inhalation dose conversion factor e inh,i (50) is the (50 year) committed effective dose per unit intake of the radionuclide [7] . Except for the dose conversion factors, all other parameters needed to calculate the ratios d/ E and d/c (k) , including the iodine release fraction f I , see equations (11)- (13), are treated as stochastic variables. The probability density functions of the parameters are provided in table 4, giving the shape and range of each distribution. While not required, the parameters in this example are assumed to be independent variables.
Transfer of radionuclides to the food groups beef, lamb, leafy vegetables, and milk are considered and the transfer factors for peak activity concentration in the foodstuffs have been estimated with the ECOSYS model [22] . The transfer factors, especially for meat and milk, will depend strongly on the season. For the present calculations deposition is assumed to take place on October 1, for which the transfer factors are close to their maximum values. The results of the ECOSYS model calculations are provided in table 5.
To account for the uncertainty in the estimate of the transfer of radionuclides to foodstuffs, the transfer factors from table 5 are multiplied by a common factor u TF , which is ascribed a lognormal distribution with geometric mean value e µ = 1, and geometric standard deviation e s = 3, see table 4. Similarly, dose rate measurement uncertainty is accounted for by multiplying the dose rate by a lognormal distributed factor u d with geometric mean value e µ = 1, and geometric standard deviation e s = 1.5.
Probability density functions.
The dose rate action levels for sheltering and foodstuff restrictions are given as quantiles of the probability density functions p(z) and p(z), respectively. These can be obtained from the joint probability distribution of the model parameters listed in table 4 by Monte Carlo sampling. In the present study, the calculation of the pdfs has been carried out by latin-hypercube sampling using the Crystal Ball software [23] .
A few examples of the resulting pdfs are shown in figure 3 . Since in most cases a single radionuclide or a few radionuclides dominate the observed external gamma dose rate as well as the avertable dose/activity concentration in foodstuffs, one may expect the parameters z,z to be approximately lognormal distributed. This is clearly observed in figure 3 where lognormal distributions are fitted to the pdfs. The geometric mean and standard deviation of the four distributions shown are given in table 6 . From the pdfs, dose rate action levels can be estimated according to equations (4), (7). In table 7 action levels for sheltering and for foodstuff restrictions are shown corresponding to the 5% and 10% quantiles of the distributions p(z) and p(z). Also shown in the table are the operational intervention levels from equations (6), (8) . For sheltering the dose rate action levels (5% quantile) range from a few tens of microsieverts per hour (scenario 2) to a few (This figure is in colour only in the electronic version) Table 7 . Dose rate action levels and operational intervention levels (µSv h −1 ) in the two accident release scenarios.
Gaseous release (scenario 1) Aerosol release (scenario 2) hundred (scenario 1). The smaller action levels of scenario 2 are due to the release of aerosols which contribute to the inhalation dose but only little to the external dose rate. The radionuclide activity concentrations in foodstuffs will vary considerably, depending for example on the time of year and on the nature and amount of rainfall. For deposition taking place during the growth season, the dose rate action level may be as low as one nanosievert per hour (scenario 2), stemming from the transfer of iodine to milk and leafy vegetables. Action levels for restrictions on the use of beef and lamb are somewhat higher, ranging from a few tens of nanosieverts per hour (cesium, scenario 2), to the order of 100 µSv h −1 (iodine, scenario 1). The operational intervention levels shown in table 7 are in most cases found to be of similar magnitude as the 10% quantile dose rate action level; only for sheltering is the OIL approximately twice the value of d AL (10%). The relatively small value of the OIL implies that the implicit assumption d AL < d OIL , see figure 2, is only fulfilled for action levels based on a probability r AL , which is smaller than approx. 10%.
Discussion
Automatic gamma-monitoring networks intended for early warning about nuclear accidents can provide a first estimate of the severity of the radiological situation and the need for introducing countermeasures. Due to the large variability and uncertainty associated with the release, the exposure pathways, the effectiveness of a given countermeasure and the detection of radionuclides, such an estimate must be based upon a probabilistic assessment of the measured quantities and the avertable doses. While a decision on intervention normally should be based on an estimate of the avertable dose, properly defined, measurable quantities may be used as a surrogate for avertable doses. Two levels are introduced to describe the probability distribution of avertable doses, the action level, for which there is a small (but finite) probability that intervention is justified, and the operational intervention level, for which it is expected that intervention is justified. In the methodology presented, action levels and operational intervention levels for specific countermeasures are determined from the distribution of the ratio of the avertable dose to the measured gamma dose rate from a passing plume. Modelling this ratio is rather straightforward, allowing for practical calculations of action levels in terms of measurable radiation quantities.
The probabilistic method hinges upon advance calculations of dose rates and avertable doses by specific countermeasures in a nuclear accident scenario where radionuclides are released to the atmosphere. Due to the modelling uncertainty the action levels themselves will be sensitive to the specific model assumptions and parameter values employed. To increase the reliability on the calculated action levels for specific countermeasures, it is important to reduce the associated uncertainty. One way of doing so is to apply properly defined, measurable radiation quantities, aiming for quantities that are strongly correlated with the avertable dose.
For the urgent countermeasures of iodine prophylaxis, where only the content of radioiodine affects the avertable dose, and for foodstuff restrictions, where the avertable dose is dominated by iodine and cesium isotopes, a strong correlation with the measured external dose rate is less obvious. If spectral measurements are available, energy window count rates appropriate for the iodine and cesium spectral energies may be used as a basis for estimating the avertable dose, and action levels can be expressed in terms of such energy window count rates. The choice of quantity, however, may be limited by technical considerations, for example the availability of detectors and the need for fast and robust measurements. the gamma dose rate or total spectral count rates may be more robust quantities for assessing the avertable doses, also in the case of foodstuff restrictions or iodine prophylaxis, provided the radionuclide composition can be assessed independently, for example through information on plant condition and on the release parameters.
In a case study on a nuclear accident with long-range atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides dose rate operational intervention levels are found to be of the order of 700 µSv h −1 for a gaseous release and 60 µSv h −1 for a core melt release. These levels are approximately 20 times smaller than corresponding OILs provided by IAEA [5] . This is in part due to IAEA choosing a higher intervention level (50 mSv) for sheltering than applied in this study (10 mSv). The remaining difference can be attributed to the effect of fluctuations originating in the variability and uncertainty in the dose estimates, and that the measurements in the present study are assumed to be taken away from the plume centreline. Both these effects will reduce the dose rate operational intervention levels. However, these effects are not considered by IAEA.
Action levels in the case study are found to be of the order of 10 µSv h −1 for sheltering for a core melt release, while the dose rate action levels for restrictions on milk and green vegetables can be as low as a few nanosieverts per hour. This suggests that measurable quantities other than ambient dose equivalent rate are needed for decisions on the introduction of foodstuff countermeasures following a release containing significant amounts of aerosols. More suitable measurements would be on-line gamma spectral measurements on particle filters with a shielded detector or on-line gamma spectral measurements of surface contamination density with a shielded detector. The method described may readily be extended to account for such measurement types.
The results of the study show that in most cases the optimised operational intervention levels are close to the action level given by the 10% quantile of p(z). Therefore, with a cautious approach for the introduction of a countermeasure, for example a 10% probability of the avertable dose exceeding the intervention level, the OIL and the AL for a given countermeasure are close to each other. Hence, from a practical perspective, only one trigger level for each countermeasure may be needed. Note that this result is somewhat model dependent, as the relative values of the OIL and the AL depend on the size of the fluctuations of the distribution p(z). From a practical perspective, site-and accident-specific dose rate action levels are straightforward to implement when an automatic alarm is already implemented. 
